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s
OR GENERATIONS BOTH past and present, the story of
America is one of immigration. There is no better reminder 
of this than the Statue of Liberty, which extends the invita-
tion, “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses
yearning to breathe free…,” to immigrants from around the
world. Yet the role of immigration in the U.S. economy is 
not easy to decipher. Among the many questions immigration re-
searchers grapple with are (1) what motivates immigrants to come 
to the United States, (2) how do immigrants from different countries
fare once they arrive and (3) what are the costs and benefits of 
immigration.
To foster understanding on these issues, the El Paso Branch of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas hosted the conference, “Immigration
and the Economy.”
1 This article is the first in a two-part series ad-
dressing the complex issue of immigration that draws upon the ideas
discussed at the conference. Part I introduces the framework under
which immigration discussions often fall; Part II will focus on the costs
and benefits of immigration—at both the national and regional levels.
Immigration: The Numbers
More than a million people a year immigrate to the United States.




What’s New About the 
New Economy?
Latin American Central Banking:
Does Independence 
Make a Difference?permanent residence. Another 250,000
are undocumented immigrants who
make their way into the population
numbers.
2 About 40 percent of such im-
migrants first entered the country
legally—as students, tourists, short-term
employees—but have since overstayed
their allotted time.
3 In all, about 25 mil-
lion immigrants are living in the United
States—an all-time high; however, as a
percentage of the population, the share
of immigrants is well below its historical
high. From 1870 through 1920, 13 per-
cent to 15 percent of the U.S. popula-
tion consisted of immigrants. Today, that
proportion is only 9.3 percent.
4
Immigrants are highly concentrated
in certain areas of the United States; 
almost a third live in California. Texas
ranks fourth, with 8.4 percent of the 
immigrant population (Chart 1).
5 Be-
cause immigrants are concentrated within
so few states, assessing both the national
and regional impact of immigration is
crucial.
Immigration as Trade
Immigration can be seen as a form of
international trade. Immigrants provide
labor services to businesses in destina-
tion countries and often return a por-
tion of what they earn to their home
countries in the form of remittances.
Similar to the benefits of free trade 
in goods, both the immigrant-receiving
countries and the immigrant-sending
countries can benefit from this trade in
human capital.
6 For example, one of the
main benefits of free trade in goods is
that the increased competition leads to
lower consumer prices. Likewise, the
increased competition for jobs brought
about by immigration—or free trade in
labor—can decrease the cost of goods
imported laborers are relatively better
able or more willing to produce than
are native workers. It also allows the
native population to shift to activities
for which they have a comparative ad-
vantage.
Many countries, such as Mexico, Por-
tugal, Turkey and Egypt, reap the bene-
fits of having exported migrants. In
1996, for example, families and busi-
nesses in Mexico received about $4.2
billion in remittances from Mexican na-
tionals living and working in other
countries. Countries such as Saudi Ara-
bia and the United States, which receive
a large fraction of the world’s immi-
grants, benefit from the labor services
provided by immigrants. Immigrants in
Page  2 Southwest Economy   July/August 1998 
Chart 1
States Where Immigrants Are Concentrated
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and often return a
portion of what they
earn to their home
countries in the form
of remittances. these countries pay a large fraction of
the world’s remittances (Chart 2).
7
Why Do People Migrate?
The most obvious reason people mi-
grate is that they expect to be better
off—either socially or economically—if
they move to another country. About
100,000 immigrants a year are admitted
to the United States for humanitarian
reasons. Their motivation for leaving
their home country is clear: they are
refugees and asylum seekers fleeing per-
secution, discrimination or oppression.
8
For the remainder of immigrants, the
traditional view is that migration deci-
sions are motivated by income differ-
ences across borders. This incentive is
probably stronger than in the past, as
the income gap between the richest and
poorest countries has risen substan-
tially, from a ratio of 38-to-1 in 1960 to
52-to-1 in 1985.
9 Thus, higher incomes
in immigrant-receiving countries could
be a factor that increases migration.
Similarly, changes in real wages be-
tween two countries can affect the in-
centive to migrate. Recent research using
data on apprehensions of illegal (or 
undocumented) immigrants attempting
to cross the U.S.–Mexican border con-
cludes that the number of apprehen-
sions corresponds to changes in Mexican
and U.S. wages. Increases in Mexican
real wages result in a decline in appre-
hensions at the border, while increases
in U.S. real wages result in an increase
in apprehensions. Interestingly, it is the
purchasing power of the U.S. dollar in
Mexico, more than its purchasing power
in the United States, that results in a
change in border apprehensions. The
fact that migrants to the U.S. care about
the purchasing power of the dollar 
in Mexico suggests that prospective 
migrants expect to remit a portion of
their earnings to Mexico.
10 Economic
crises that affect wages—such as the
severe devaluations that have plagued
Latin American countries and, more re-
cently, countries in Asia—can become
factors that significantly influence mi-
gration decisions.
Migrant Networks Are Important
The argument that migration deci-
sions are based primarily on wage and
income differentials is compelling. How-
ever, research suggests that while these
differentials may provide the initial im-
petus for immigration, the creation of
family and social networks in immi-
grant-receiving countries has become
more significant as a factor influencing
further immigration. Once the process
of immigration has begun, there seems
to be a strong tendency for it to become
self-perpetuating.
11
Networks have become more sophis-
ticated as more immigrants have estab-
lished themselves in the United States.
According to a binational study on mi-
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SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 1997.gration between the United States and
Mexico, “new employers and labor bro-
kers, along with cross-border social net-
works of relatives and friends, link an
expanding list of U.S. industries, occu-
pations and areas to a lengthening list
of Mexican communities that send mi-
grants to the U.S.”
12 (See the box titled
“Immigration from Mexico.”) Having a
social tie to a migrant family member in
the United States has also been found to
increase the wages, hours of work and
total monthly incomes of new immi-
grants, regardless of their country of 
origin: having kin contacts in the work-
place aids immigrants in finding job
connections, communicating with po-
tential employers and establishing refer-
ences.
13
Once immigrants reach the United
States, family and social networks are
the primary determinants of where they
will settle. Economic conditions, such
as the unemployment rate in a particu-
lar region, play a smaller role in immi-
grants’ locational decisions, while public
policies, such as welfare benefits and
average tax payments, have little or no
impact on these decisions.
14
Family and social networks are more
powerful draws for immigration in part
because of U.S. immigration legislation.
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Immigration from Mexico
Mexico is the No. 1 source of immigrants
to the United States. This is not surprising
given geography and economics. The two
countries contrast dramatically in earnings
and income levels. With a joint border of
2,000 miles and significant income dispar-
ity, international migration would seem in-
evitable. Just as Mexican migrants are
drawn to the United States in search of eco-
nomic improvement, the U.S. labor market
draws on these migrants as a source of
readily available and inexpensive labor.
Mexico-to-U.S. migration is closely
linked to periods of economic necessity in
each country. For example, the United
States recruited Mexican workers when it
suffered labor shortages during World Wars
I and II. In fact, the Bracero program, a binational initiative launched in 1942, was so suc-
cessful in filling the U.S. need for seasonal agricultural workers that it lasted more than 20
years. Correspondingly, periods in Mexico of high inflation and economic recession have
prompted the movement north of some of the country’s labor force. Recent trends in migra-
tion, though still largely motivated by economic factors, are sustained and facilitated through
a growing family and social network in the United States. In addition, as enforcement efforts
at the border have grown, migrant-smuggling operations have become more established and
sophisticated, perpetuating a steady flow of undocumented immigrants to the United States.
For example, a recent study estimated that approximately 70 percent of successful crossings
by such immigrants from Tijuana to San Diego in 1996 took place through smugglers.*
In the past, dialogue on migration between the United States and Mexico was not easy,
as the United States usually opted for unilateral decisions on the matter, while Mexico tradi-
tionally adopted a stance of nonintervention. However, the 1990s brought a change in this re-
gard as bilateral dialogue on migration has increased, largely fueled by the institutional
framework of cooperation embedded in NAFTA. In fact, in 1994, the two governments de-
cided for the first time to sponsor a binational study on migration, which was published last
year. This type of thorough, cooperative analysis of migration could lead to a better under-
standing of the subject and to mutually beneficial policies that address the issue.
* B. Lindsay Lowell, Director of Policy Research, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform; presentation on
the Mexico–U.S. Binational Study on Migration at the Third Annual International Economic Forum of the



























SOURCE: Mexico–U.S. Binational Study on Migration.The Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments of 1965 replaced the 
national origin quota system, which 
favored European immigrants, with a
preference system that made family re-
unification the first priority; skill-based
applicants and refugees were placed
lower on the priority list. This act also
opened the door to immigration from
Asia and Latin America. As a result, hav-
ing a family member already in the
United States has become the chief 
criterion upon which an immigrant’s
ability to enter this country rests.
The Changing Composition 
of Immigrants
A major result of the preference sys-
tem created by the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act Amendments of 1965 has
been a change in the composition of
immigrants to the United States. Be-
tween 1951 and 1960, 66 percent of
legal immigrants to the United States
were from Europe or Canada, while 32
percent came from Asia, Latin America
and Mexico. Between 1981 and 1990,
the share of immigrants from Europe
and Canada dropped to 15 percent,
while the share from Asia, Latin Amer-
ica and Mexico jumped to 83 percent
(Chart 3).
15
Concurrent with the changing com-
position of the immigrant population
has been a change in the economic 
performance of immigrants relative to
natives. U.S. immigrants on average earn
less than native workers, and the deficit
has been growing mainly because the
gap in education and skills has been
widening. According to the National Re-
search Council, “This relative decline in
immigrant skills and wages can be at-
tributed essentially to a single factor—
the fact that those who have come most
recently have come from poorer coun-
tries, where the average education and
wage and skill levels are far below
those in the United States.”
16 Indeed,
when broken down by country of 
origin, immigrants from Europe and
Canada generally earn significantly
higher wages than U.S. natives, while
immigrants from Latin America and Asia
earn significantly lower wages.
The gap between the educational at-
tainment of immigrants versus that of
U.S. natives has widened substantially
since 1970, as the average education
level of U.S. natives has increased faster
than that of immigrants. However,
much of this gap can be explained by
the influx of undocumented immi-
grants, who are generally more poorly
educated. Indeed, while only 4 percent
of total Mexican immigrants possess
college degrees, 15 percent of legal
Mexican immigrants are college gradu-
ates. Recent immigrants from Mexico,
Guatemala and El Salvador—which
supply more than 60 percent of undoc-
umented immigrants to the United
States—have a 71 percent high school
dropout rate.
17 However, legal immi-
grants to the United States from the rest
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  5
Chart 3
Changing Composition of Legal Immigrants to the United States
































country rests.of the world have only a 28 percent
dropout rate—more in line with the 16
percent rate for U.S. natives. At the
other end of the education spectrum,
legal immigrants come out ahead: 36
percent of recent legal immigrants to
the United States have college degrees
versus only 24 percent of U.S. natives.
Ignoring the legal status of immi-
grants may also confound discussions
of relative wage differentials. Chart 4 
illustrates the wage differentials of im-
migrants, relative to U.S. natives, by
country of origin. Because the data
make no distinction as to the legal sta-
tus of these immigrants, much of the
emphasis on the bottom end of the
chart may be due to the presence of un-
documented and humanitarian admis-
sions to the United States—groups that
have different socioeconomic character-
istics, are governed by different laws
and regulations, and are eligible for dif-




The U.S. immigration landscape con-
tinues to evolve, the result of both mod-
ifications in U.S. immigration policy and
changing economies around the world.
As more migrants arrive from Mexico
and Latin America than from Europe
and Canada, the perceptions and the 
realities of immigration’s impacts will
continue to change.
Much of the immigration debate in
the United States has been fueled by the
changing composition of immigrants
and the increasing numbers of undocu-
mented immigrants. In the end, how-
ever, the debate will hinge on the costs
and benefits of international migration.
While most studies of the costs and
benefits of immigration to the United
States conclude that immigration pro-
vides a net benefit, Part II of this article
will show that the situation is much more
complicated. Even when the economy
as a whole gains from immigration,
there may be losers as well as winners
among different groups of U.S. natives
and within different regions of the
country.
— Beverly Fox Kellam
Lucinda Vargas
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Chart 4
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NOTE: The statistics are calculated in the subsample of men aged 25–64 years who work in the civilian sector, are not
self-employed and do not reside in group quarters.The educational attainment of native men in 1990 is 13.2 years.
SOURCE: 1990 Public Use Sample of the U.S. Census of Population.
sHERE IS A hot, ongoing debate
over whether the behavior of
the economy has fundamen-
tally changed. This debate has
been brought on by the econ-
omy’s extraordinary performance
over the past seven years. Since 1991
output has grown faster than most 
people had thought possible—without
an acceleration of inflation. The stock
and residential real estate markets are
booming, the federal budget is in sur-
plus and consumer confidence is near an
all-time high. Sustained good news has
led increasingly to talk of a “new para-
digm.” It’s argued that global competi-
tion has made it difficult for firms to
raise prices. Tight labor markets may
cause wage increases, but these cost
pressures are offset by productivity
growth. If anything, it is deflation, not
inflation, that is a threat. Further, some
argue that output growth at recent rates
can continue indefinitely, provided that
monetary policy is sufficiently accom-
modative. They also argue that changes
in the composition of economic activity
and new, more flexible ways of or-
ganizing production and distribution
mean that the business cycle is dead. 
At the very least, traditional business-
cycle indicators have lost much of their
usefulness.
This article sheds some light on 
factors that have contributed to the
economy’s recent extraordinary macro-
economic performance. It argues that
the combination of strong output
growth and low inflation we have 
experienced cannot be attributed to 
unusually strong productivity growth.
Some of the other elements of the 
new-paradigm story, however, receive
considerable empirical support. For 
example, there are indications of a 
notable shift in firms’ pricing power that
may be linked to increasing global com-
petition. Also, the idea that new pro-
duction and distribution technologies
have helped smooth the business cycle
appears to be correct.
Rapid Output Growth: 
Can It Be Sustained?
Can the economy keep on growing
like this forever? Only if trend produc-
tivity growth accelerates. Since 1991
business-sector productivity has in-
creased at a 1.3 percent annual rate,
while the adult population has in-
creased at a 1 percent annual rate.
Meantime, business output has risen 3.3
percent per year. The 1-percentage-
point gap between output growth and
productivity-adjusted population growth
has been filled by increases in the
labor-force participation rate and hours
worked per employee, and decreases in
the unemployment rate. Physical limits
on the participation rate, hours worked
and unemployment rate mean that out-
put growth derived from changes in
these variables cannot continue forever.
As a practical matter, with the participa-
tion rate and factory hours near their
post–World War II highs and the unem-
ployment rate at its lowest level in al-
most 30 years, it’s likely that only a
pickup in trend productivity growth can
keep output growing at recent rates for
any significant period of time.
1
To illustrate the difficulty in continu-
ing on our current path, Chart 1 plots
changes in the unemployment rate
against changes in real GDP.
2 With a
single exception (1992), GDP growth
rates in excess of 2 percent have been
achieved only as a result of declines in
unemployment. Conversely, GDP growth
rates below 2 percent have been ac-
companied by increases in unemploy-
ment. Since the unemployment rate
cannot fall indefinitely, GDP growth
cannot continue indefinitely at rates
much above 2 percent without faster
productivity growth.
Although the solid output gains
we’ve observed over the past seven
years cannot be attributed to rapid 
productivity growth, an acceleration in
measured productivity growth may 
now be underway. A series of methodo-
logical improvements to the Consumer
Price Index that will continue into 1999
is expected to add about half a percent-
age point to productivity growth, raising
the economy’s sustainable rate of GDP
growth from between 2 percent and
2.25 percent to between 2.5 percent
and 2.75 percent.
3 Output growth of 2.5
percent to 2.75 percent is substantially
below the 4.1 percent growth rate
we’ve enjoyed over the past six quar-
ters, but fairly close to the 2.8 percent
average growth rate we’ve seen during
this expansion as a whole. Of course, to
avoid higher inflation, it may not be
enough for output growth to stabilize at
2.5 percent to 2.75 percent if the level
of output is above potential.
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Rapid Output Growth 
Is Not Sustainable
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor; U.S. Department
of Commerce; author’s calculations.of monetary policy. For example, the
upward shift that occurred in the early
1970s followed several years in which
policymakers allowed money growth 
to accelerate in an (ultimately vain) 
attempt to keep the unemployment rate
low. The downward shift in the mid-
1980s occurred only after policymakers
demonstrated that they were willing to
tolerate high unemployment, if neces-
sary, to move the inflation rate lower. In
empirical work, expected inflation is
usually assumed to be a weighted aver-
age of lagged actual inflation. Although
this treatment of inflation expectations is
simplistic, it has generally performed well.
Besides shifting in response to
changes in expected inflation, the
Phillips curve is buffeted about by 
“supply-side shocks” such as changes in
the relative prices of food, energy and
imports. A problematic feature of supply-
side shocks is that they are typically dif-
ficult to predict very far in advance.
This characteristic potentially limits the
usefulness of the Phillips curve to poli-
cymakers: a wide range of unemploy-
ment rates may be consistent with
stable aggregate inflation, depending
on the vagaries of food, energy and im-
port prices.
Are favorable supply-side shocks and
shifting inflation expectations sufficient
to explain the low and falling inflation
rates we have seen over the past three
years? To see, I fitted a conventional
Phillips curve equation to annual data
through 1994, then used this equation
to predict inflation over the period from
1995 to 1997.
4 A total of three different
predictions were prepared for each year.
Each set of predictions is conditioned
on the actual path of the unemploy-
ment rate. The predictions differ in their
treatment of inflation expectations and
supply-side shocks.
The first set of predictions is based
on the static Phillips curve of Chart 2:
inflation expectations are held fixed and
supply-side shocks are ignored. The
second set of predictions models ex-
pected inflation as an average of past
inflation rates and is conditioned on 
realized changes in food and energy
prices. The third set of predictions 
allows inflation expectations to vary
and is conditioned on realized values of
food, energy and import prices. Predic-
Low Inflation: 
Is the Phillips Curve Dead?
A striking feature of the economy’s
performance over the past four years is
how well behaved inflation has been,
despite tight labor markets. Inflation
usually rises as the unemployment rate
falls—a negative relationship called the
Phillips curve, after New-Zealand-born
economist A. W. Phillips. As shown in
Chart 2, the inflation–unemployment ex-
perience during the late 1980s and early
1990s followed the historical pattern. In
the years since 1993, however, the un-
employment rate has fallen by 2 per-
centage points without any increase in
output-price inflation. Indeed, inflation
has declined! This experience has led
some analysts to declare the Phillips
curve dead.
One response is to argue that the
Phillips curve is not dead, merely shift-
ing. Shifts in the Phillips curve are noth-
ing new—the Phillips curve over the
10-year period from 1985 to 1994 is
very different from that observed from
1974 to 1983, for example, or from that
observed during the 1960s. (Again, see
Chart 2.) Large, sustained shifts in the
Phillips curve can generally be attrib-
uted to changes in long-run inflation
expectations, which are, in turn, often
an outgrowth of changes in the conduct
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor; U.S. Department
of Commerce; author’s calculations.tions are compared with actual inflation
in Chart 3.
As we knew already from Chart 2,
the static Phillips curve model performs
abysmally during the past three years,
overpredicting inflation by an average
of 1.9 percentage points from 1995 to
1997. Controlling for changes in food
and energy prices and allowing inflation
expectations to reflect past declines in
actual inflation improve the perform-
ance of the Phillips curve model, but it
still overpredicts inflation substantially
over the three-year out-of-sample period.
It is only when one controls for the
pressure on U.S. prices coming from
overseas competition that the predic-
tions of the Phillips curve model match
up well with actual inflation.
The findings summarized in Chart 3
are broadly consistent with the new-
paradigm view of the economy. One
lesson is that inflation predictions based
solely on the unemployment rate and
past inflation aren’t worth much in an
economy subject to large supply-side
shocks. A second lesson is that overseas
competition has played a major role in
restraining U.S. inflation in recent years.
A corollary lesson is that how sanguine
one feels about current U.S. inflation
prospects ought to depend very much
on one’s view of the outlook for foreign
inflation and the strength of the dollar.
There is much less empirical support
for another inflation story that some-
times carries the new-paradigm label—
the story that accelerating wage increases
have failed to translate into higher out-
put-price inflation because of a surge 
in productivity growth. The problem is
that business-sector labor productivity
growth averaged only 1.1 percent per
year from 1994 through 1997 (the period
over which the inflation–unemploy-
ment relationship appears to have bro-
ken down)—a rate of productivity
increase identical to that recorded from
1985 through 1994. Of course, our pro-
ductivity measures may be faulty—they
may have failed to capture a surge of
productivity growth in the service sec-
tor, for example. But an unmeasured 
acceleration in productivity growth will
show up only in an increase in unmeas-
ured real wage growth. (Price gains will
be overstated, leading to an under-
statement of real wage growth.) Un-
measured productivity growth cannot
explain recent increases in measured
real wage growth.
Nevertheless, the view that recent
wage increases will not soon place up-
ward pressure on output prices may be
correct. Supporting evidence is pre-
sented in Chart 4, which displays a plot
of the ratio of output prices to unit
labor costs. (Unit labor costs measure
productivity-adjusted wages.) Chart 4
shows that pricing power has been on
the decline since 1994. However, the 
really striking feature of Chart 4 is how
high the price/labor-cost ratio had pre-
viously risen—one has to go all the
way back to 1965 to find comparable
figures. There is considerable room for
further acceleration of wage growth,
relative to price growth, before mark-
ups return to historically normal levels.
A Clear Change for the Better: 
The Business Cycle Has Lost 
Some of Its Sting
5
As shown in Chart 5, the current ex-
pansion is the third-longest on record
and comes on the heels of the second-
longest expansion on record. (Arguably,
there would have been no interruption
to growth in 1990–91 had Iraq not in-
vaded Kuwait.) Do changes in the struc-
ture of the economy and new ways of
organizing the production and distribu-
tion of goods mean that we have less to
fear from the business cycle?
There is pretty solid evidence that
the economy really has been more sta-
ble over the past decade and a half than
it was in the 1970s or even the 1960s.
The increased stability is evident in
Chart 6, which plots annualized quar-
terly real GDP growth from 1959
through 1997. Vertical lines divide the
plot into three subperiods of equal
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  9
Chart 3









’97 ’95 ’93 ’91 ’89 ’87 ’85
Predicted with dynamic expectations, 
controlling for food, energy and import prices
Predicted with dynamic expectations, 
controlling for food and energy prices
Predicted with static Phillips curve
Actual
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce; author’s
calculations.
Chart 4
Labor Costs Rising Faster Than Prices
Index, mean of nonrecessionary periods = 100











Ratio of implicit price deflator to unit labor cost,
nonfarm business sector
NOTE: Shaded bands indicate recessions.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce.length. Column 2 of Table 1 reports the
standard deviation of quarterly real
GDP growth over each of these subpe-
riods. The numbers confirm what Chart
6 suggests—that growth volatility from
1985 through the present has been
roughly half that experienced in either
of the earlier subperiods.
What has happened in the economy
to make output growth so much less vari-
able? Several stories have been offered.
One popular explanation is that we 
are moving away from a goods econ-
omy and toward a service economy.
Growth is steadier because the service-
producing sector is less volatile than 
the goods-producing sector. It’s a nice
story, but the premise is false. Although
employment has been shifting toward
the production of services, the share 
of real GDP accounted for by goods 
has been rising slowly—not falling
(Chart 7 ). Durable goods are increas-
ing in importance relative to nondur-
able goods.
There is no question that interna-
tional trade is playing a larger and
larger role in the U.S. economy. As a
percentage of GDP, real imports rose
more than threefold between 1959 and
1997, from 4.8 percent to 15.4 percent.
Exports rose more than fourfold, from
3.3 percent of GDP to 13.4 percent over
the same period. Exports and imports
might be expected to serve as buffers
between domestic demand fluctuations
and domestic production. It’s plausible,
therefore, that the globalization of the
economy accounts for the reduced
volatility of U.S. output growth. Plausi-
ble, but incorrect. The trade sector does
play a stabilizing role in the economy,
but this stabilizing role has not been in-
creasing in importance. It contributes
almost nothing to the reduced output-
growth volatility we have seen since the
mid-1980s.
We can gauge the impact of interna-
tional trade on the stability of U.S. out-
put growth by comparing the volatility
of gross domestic product growth with
the volatility of growth in gross domes-
tic purchases. U.S. gross domestic pur-
chases are the total quantity of goods
and services purchased in the United
States, including our imports and ex-
cluding our exports. As such, gross 
domestic purchases approximate what
gross domestic product would have
been in the absence of international
trade. Table 1 reports the standard de-
viations of purchases and product in
columns 3 and 2, respectively. Note that
the entries in column 3 are consistently
larger than those in column 2. The im-
plication is that net exports acted to 
stabilize output growth in every sub-
period of our sample. However, the
ratio of standard deviations (column 4)
exhibits no clear trend. It follows that
the amount of stabilization provided by
international trade has not increased
over time, despite the rapid increases in
the volume of trade we have witnessed.
The lion’s share of the reduction in
the volatility of output growth appears
to have been a result of better inventory
management. To see this, we can strip
inventory investment from real GDP
and look at the growth contribution
from final sales of domestic product.
The standard deviation of this growth
contribution is displayed in column 6 of
Table 1. The fact that this standard de-
viation declines very little as we move
from the early to the late subperiod in-
dicates that were it not for inventories,
output growth would have been nearly
as volatile from 1985 to 1997 as it was
from 1959 to 1971. Hence, improved in-
ventory management techniques have
paid off in increased macroeconomic
stability.
6
Summary and Implications 
for Monetary Policy
The U.S. economy has performed ex-
traordinarily well over the past seven
years, generating solid, uninterrupted
output gains and falling inflation. This
strong performance has led many people
to wonder whether “the rules have
changed”—whether the economy’s be-
havior is now fundamentally different.
Certainly we are seeing rapid techno-
logical advance, a freer flow of goods
and services between countries and the
adoption of new methods for organiz-
Page  10 Southwest Economy   July/August 1998
Chart 5
Still Going…
Real chain-weighted GDP index, 
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce.ing the production and distribution of
goods and services. These innovations
have had an important impact on the
types of jobs available, on income mo-
bility and on the quality of life.
7 But are
they important for monetary policy?
Have they changed the character of the
business cycle? The evidence is mixed.
It is clear that a substantial portion of
the output gains we’ve enjoyed have
been achieved not through rapid pro-
ductivity growth but by utilizing the
labor force more intensively. Significant
further increases in labor-force utiliza-
tion rates are probably not sustainable.
Hence, employment growth rates are
likely to taper off soon. Output growth
must also decelerate, unless measured
productivity growth picks up. A round
of technical improvements to our price
indexes may give measured productiv-
ity growth the required boost. In any
event, it’s not the Federal Reserve’s job
to try to dictate if or when a slowing in
real growth will occur. Rather, it’s the
Fed’s job to try to keep measures of
nominal demand expanding steadily, at
a pace consistent with low long-run in-
flation (Koenig 1995).
New-paradigm advocates are correct
when they say that firms’ pricing power
has diminished recently and that this
change in pricing power has been re-
flected in a shift in the trade-off be-
tween unemployment and output-price
inflation. Here again, accelerating pro-
ductivity growth is an inadequate ex-
planation for what’s gone on. However,
it’s clear that increasing global competi-
tion has helped hold price increases in
check. The fact that the ratio of output
prices to unit labor costs remains at a
high level raises hopes that low infla-
tion can continue for a while longer,
even if labor markets stay tight.
The idea that the real economy is
less volatile now than in the past also
seems to be correct. The explanation is
neither that the economy has become
less goods intensive nor that markets
have become more global in scope.
Most of the credit goes to more tightly
controlled inventories. The undiminished
importance of goods production in ag-
gregate output suggests that traditional
leading indicators—which are oriented
toward the goods-producing sector—
have not outlived their usefulness. This
fact and the economy’s increased stabil-
ity mean that the monetary policy-
maker’s job may be getting easier.
—Evan F. Koenig
Notes
1 Greenspan (1998) makes a similar point. For a thorough, yet read-
able, analysis of productivity trends, see Webb (1998). For a rigor-
ous test of the hypothesis that productivity growth has accelerated
during the 1990s, see Filardo and Cooper (1997).
2 Chart 1 is an updated version of a chart presented in Krugman (1996)
and Koenig (1997).
3 For a description of the technical changes to the CPI, see Jacobs (1997).
4 I estimated a vector autoregression in fourth-quarter-over-fourth-
quarter changes in the relative price of food and energy, fourth-quar-
ter-over-fourth-quarter changes in the relative price of imports, the
fourth-quarter unemployment rate, and fourth-quarter-over-fourth-
quarter changes in the chain-weight GDP price index. Changes in the
relative import price were weighted by the value of imports relative to
the value of gross domestic purchases.
5 For a more detailed analysis of the issues discussed in this section,
see McConnell and Quiros (1997).
6 Alternatively, there may have been a shift in the composition of out-
put toward goods-producing industries where inventories are more
easily controlled.
7 The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas has devoted several annual re-
ports to these issues. See Cox and Alm (1992–96).
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Chart 7
The Share of Goods in Real
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Table 1
Why Has Output Growth Become Less Volatile?
(Analysis of annualized quarterly changes in various aggregate measures of real economic activity)
Real GDP Gross domestic purchases Final sales of domestic product
Standard Standard Standard
Interval deviation deviation Col. 2/Col. 3 deviation Col. 2/Col. 5
1959–71 .951 1.039 .915 .695 1.368
1972–84 1.226 1.394 .879 .961 1.276
1985–97 .501 .559 .896 .534 .938
NOTE: In general, X = Y – Z (and, hence, DY/Y = DX/Y + DZ/Y), where Y is real GDP and X and Z are var-
iously defined. In columns 3 and 4, X represents gross domestic purchases and Z is net exports;
in columns 5 and 6, X is final sales of domestic product and Z is inventory investment. The table
reports the standard deviations of DY/Y and DX/Y and the ratios of these standard deviations.INCE THE 1980s, many countries
in Latin America have undergone
fundamental changes to their 
political and economic structures.
Democracies are beginning to take
hold where authoritarian regimes
were common; large state-run enter-
prises are being dismantled or sold; and
economic growth, which eluded the re-
gion for most of the previous decade, is
slowly returning.
Accompanying these political and
economic shifts have been fundamental
reforms to central banking. Central
banks have become more independent,
and policy has grown more transparent.
Countries such as Chile, Mexico and
Peru have all taken steps to create more
independent central banks. The aim of
these changes has been to create a
more credible anti-inflation program,
and recent inflation rates in the region
seem to indicate that the reforms are
working. As Chart 1 shows, after experi-
encing damaging price instability over
the past two decades, inflation in Latin
American countries has declined from
over 500 percent in 1990 to just under
14 percent last year.
But how much of Latin America’s re-
cent success in fighting inflation is due
to more independent central banks, and
how much is due to other fundamen-
tal economic and political changes? Al-
though institutional changes to central
banks can make a return to high infla-
tion more difficult and costly, the bot-
tom line is that there is no shortcut to
achieving a credible anti-inflation pro-
gram through such changes. Credibility
can only be achieved over time with a
demonstrated broad-based commitment
to keep inflation low.
The Argument for
Central Bank Independence
Why should the institutional frame-
work of central banks make a difference
in determining inflation? Presumably, if
a government wants lower inflation, all it
has to do is restrict fiscal spending and
slow the growth of the money supply.
The problem is, however, that a gov-
ernment’s promise to reduce inflation is
often not believable. People understand
that elected governments have an in-
centive to create higher-than-expected
inflation for temporary employment
gains and political support. If expecta-
tions of future inflation remain high,
people will not accept wage adjust-
ments of less than the rate of expected
inflation, so any attempt to reduce in-
flation will be costly in terms of in-
creased unemployment and higher
interest rates.
Central bank independence may make
a difference by reducing the elected
government’s influence on monetary pol-
icy. By  handing over monetary policy
decisions to an independent central
bank with a clear mandate to keep in-
flation low, a government may create a
more credible anti-inflation policy. The
idea is that an independent central bank
does not have the same political incen-
tive to inflate as do elected members of
government.
Prior to the 1990s, Latin America 
exemplified the difficulties associated
with creating a credible anti-inflation
policy. Mexico, for instance, suffered 
increasing bursts of inflation after sev-
eral failed inflation-fighting programs.
As Chart 2 shows, during the 1970s and
1980s, anti-inflation programs that were
implemented at inflation peaks were ul-
timately abandoned, and inflation sub-
sequently accelerated to new highs. As
inflation programs failed, the credibility
of the government’s inflation-fighting
promises diminished, and, as a result,
citizens raised their inflation expecta-
tions. Each subsequent anti-inflation
program was less effective and more
costly (in terms of reduced output) to
implement. Consequently, the govern-
ment accommodated higher inflation
expectations with an increasing rate of
money supply growth. Inflation eventu-
ally peaked in 1987 at an average an-
nual rate of over 130 percent.
A similar scenario occurred in Ar-
gentina over roughly the same period
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SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics.
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics.a central bank independent may not
mean much.
Even with the best institutions, there
appears to be no quick and easy way to
gain a credible anti-inflation program.
Credibility can only be gained over time
with a demonstrated commitment to
price stability. However, in addition to
other reforms, central bank indepen-
dence may help. It can send a powerful
signal to individuals that the elected
government is serious about reducing
inflation by making policy reversal more
difficult. If central bank independence
is pursued along with other policies
such as more transparent operating 
polices and a reduction in general fiscal
spending, a low-inflation program is that
much more credible.
After years of costly high and vari-
able inflation, polls in many Latin Amer-
ican countries indicate overwhelming
support for fiscal and monetary re-
straint, despite periods of high unem-
ployment. Recent sustained declines in
inflation in the region are consistent
with this support. Consequently, much
of Latin America’s recent central bank-
ing reform reflects a general desire to
keep inflation low. Legal central bank
independence is a key but not the sole
determinant of low inflation.
— David M. Gould
Justin Marion
Note
1 Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Indepen-
dence (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992).
when the government’s credibility fell
after each subsequent inflation burst.
Argentina’s inflation eventually peaked
at more than 3,000 percent in 1990.
Central Bank Independence
The expected benefit of an indepen-
dent central bank is that it is removed
from political control, and, as a result,
policy reversal is made more difficult. A
government that wants to boost the
money supply to increase output and
employment temporarily may find it
more difficult to do so because it would
involve changing laws and the opera-
tional structure of the central bank.
But the factors that characterize inde-
pendence are not precise, and they vary
quite a bit across countries. Actual, as
opposed to formal, central bank inde-
pendence depends not only on the de-
gree of independence conferred on the
bank by law, but also on many other
factors, such as informal arrangements
between the bank and other parts of
government, the quality of the bank’s
research department, and the personali-
ties of key individuals in the bank and
other economic policy-making depart-
ments like the treasury. Obviously, it’s
hard to quantify independence in a
completely objective manner.
There are, however, some elements
of independence that are more relevant
and easier to observe than others. Alex
Cukierman of the University of Tel Aviv
has put together a measure of central
bank independence that depends on
four factors: (1) the method by which
independence is achieved, (2) how the
head of the central bank is appointed
and the length of the appointment, (3)
the central bank’s policy mandate and
(4) restrictions on government borrow-
ing from the central bank.
1 Given these
measures, is there evidence that central
bank independence is associated with
lower inflation?
Evidence on Central Bank Inde-
pendence and Inflation. Although
central bank independence may make
an anti-inflation program more credible,
in general a relationship between legal
independence and inflation does not
hold. Chart 3 shows average inflation
rates for 68 countries mapped against
an index of central bank independence
based on the four factors mentioned
above. There does not appear to be
even a weak relationship between meas-
ured central bank independence and 
inflation.
Why isn’t measured independence
necessarily associated with lower infla-
tion? First, as mentioned above, a legal
definition of independence does not 
always mean that a bank is indepen-
dent in practice, nor does it mean that a 
bank without legal independence is run 
completely by the elected government.
Consequently, the degree of central
bank independence is sometimes diffi-
cult to measure and can be subject to
varying degrees of political pressure.
Moreover, fiscal spending is important.
Countries with large public sectors and
huge budget deficits are likely to exert
tremendous pressure on the monetary
authorities to print money to pay down
existing debt. With enough political
pressure, even constitutions can be
changed. And in countries with less 
stable governments and shorter histo-
ries of price stability, legally declaring 
Chart 3
Inflation versus Central Bank
Independence, 1980–89
Average inflation (percent)
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SOURCE: Cukierman (1992).he Texas economy continued
to grow at a fast clip in May,
with employment increasing at
a 4 percent annualized rate.
The construction and service
industries were the main sec-
tors behind this growth. However, the
detrimental effects of Southeast Asia’s 
financial crisis are showing up in the
energy and high-tech sectors.
Construction activity remains vigor-
ous, and most construction industry 
indicators are pointing to continued
strength. Employment increased at a ro-
bust 8.8 percent annual rate in May,
buoyed by the extremely strong resi-
dential sector. Both single-family and
multifamily permits continued to in-
crease in April. Residential contract 
values were also up 30 percent (annu-
alized) between March and April. Brisk
construction activity has fueled in-
creased job gains in the construction-
related manufacturing industries such as
lumber and wood, and stone, clay and
glass.
The service-producing sector contin-
ues to be a source of strength for the
Texas economy. Private service-produc-
ing sector employment growth was a
very healthy 5.5 percent (annualized) in
May. A thriving national economy con-
tinues to boost the transportation and
distribution sectors in Texas. Similar
employment growth is seen in commu-
nications services (9.3 percent annual-
ized) and narrowly defined services (6.9
percent annualized), which include
firms in business, engineering and legal
Thousands of persons Index, 1987 = 100 March–May 1998
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1995 = 100
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Texas Industrial Production Index (TIPI)
Index, January 1995 = 100
Rig Count and Oil Industry Employment
Index, January 1990 = 100
Real Texas Exports
Index, 1996:1 = 100
Percent
.40 –.60 –.40 –.20 0 .20
Average weekly hours .16
Help-wanted index
Texas Stock Index
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TRegional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
5/98 124.3 127.9 169.9 487.7 1,099.0 1,490.8 5,623.5 8,870.9 1,871.9 717.5
4/98 124.8 128.2 170.0 484.3 1,097.4 1,490.5 5,599.8 8,842.0 1,869.8 716.1
3/98 124.6 128.3 169.9 481.7 1,097.0 1,488.4 5,592.8 8,829.8 1,868.9 714.9
2/98 125.0 128.9 170.8 479.1 1,094.2 1,481.6 5,570.6 8,796.3 1,862.6 714.1
1/98 124.0 128.9 170.4 475.7 1,091.8 1,481.3 5,551.0 8,770.2 1,857.0 714.2
12/97 123.3 128.8 169.4 470.9 1,094.0 1,480.0 5,532.0 8,746.3 1,854.9 712.8
11/97 123.9 128.4 169.0 468.1 1,091.6 1,478.2 5,514.6 8,721.5 1,852.1 712.0
10/97 124.5 128.8 168.9 464.3 1,088.3 1,475.3 5,494.4 8,691.2 1,849.4 711.3
9/97 124.6 127.9 168.6 465.6 1,087.7 1,475.0 5,474.8 8,671.7 1,845.4 708.5
8/97 122.8 127.2 168.3 465.5 1,084.4 1,480.6 5,445.5 8,644.3 1,839.4 709.7
7/97 123.0 127.6 167.3 461.4 1,079.9 1,469.8 5,425.6 8,604.0 1,841.3 709.2
6/97 121.3 127.0 165.6 457.9 1,081.5 1,472.2 5,418.1 8,595.3 1,839.6 708.7
* in thousands
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services. Computer services, which are
included in the business services cate-
gory, continue to be very healthy, aug-
mented by demand for consulting for
Y2K systems upgrades.
The problems in Southeast Asia are
hurting the energy and high-tech indus-
tries. In the energy sector, low oil prices
have weakened the upstream portion of
the industry, and feeble product de-
mand and low product prices have
taken their toll on the downstream por-
tion. The decline in oil prices, due to
oversupply and an unusually warm
winter, was exacerbated by slower de-
mand from Southeast Asia. Low oil
prices have slowed what had been a 
vibrant energy industry in Texas for the
past couple years. Both employment
and rig count, good measures for the
upstream energy industry in Texas,
have weakened recently. Employment
growth has flattened, and the rig count
has dropped considerably.
The high-tech industry is undergoing
a restructuring and consolidation. Sales
and profits have fallen in the high-tech
industry as the result of two intermin-
gling factors at work: lower domestic
demand for high-end computers and
weak demand, due to the Asian crisis,
for products using chips. Employment
growth in industrial machinery (which
includes computers) and electronics
(which includes semiconductors) has
flattened in Texas.
The Asian crisis is also affecting
Texas exports. Total Texas exports fell
2.5 percent (quarter over quarter) in the
first quarter of 1998. The chart titled
“Real Texas Exports” shows that this de-
cline was concentrated in exports to
Japan and Pacific newly industrialized
countries (PACNIC). While exports to
Mexico increased 2.2 percent in the first
quarter, exports to Japan, Korea and
China fell 16 percent, 50 percent and 
41 percent, respectively. The decreases
in exports were led by declines of 2.8
percent in electronics, 6 percent in in-
dustrial machinery and 2.5 percent in
chemicals.
The Texas economy is unlikely to
sustain the high rate of employment
gains seen in the first five months of the
year. The continuing drag from South-
east Asia, along with the expected de-
celeration of the national economy,
should slow Texas growth in the sec-
ond half of the year.
—Mine K. Yücel
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Further Information on the Data
For more information on employment data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment Growth” (Southwest Economy,
July/August 1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic Review, November
1989). For the Texas Leading Index and its components, see “The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: A Revision and
Further Evaluation” (Dallas Fed Economic Review, July 1990). Online economic data and articles are available on
the Dallas Fed’s Internet Web site, www.dallasfed.org.SWE SWE SWE Upcoming Event Upcoming Event









Hyatt Regency Hotel, San Antonio
Air Quality and Economic Growth: Defining Prosperity in the New
Millennium will focus on air quality in Texas and strategies for
achieving compliance with EPA standards. Speakers will discuss
the effects of the new standards on businesses, the measures
other states are taking to achieve compliance, and the usefulness
of market-based approaches to air pollution reduction.
The conference is sponsored by the San Antonio Branch of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. For more information call Rachel
Peña at (210) 978-1663.
Air Quality and Economic Growth
Defining Prosperity in the New Millennium